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Future Agricultures Consortium. This is supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘Rising Powers 
and Interdependent Futures’ programme (www.risingpowers.net). We expect 24 papers to be published during 
2015, each linked to short videos presented by the lead authors. 
The CBAA team is based in Brazil (University of Brasilia, Gertulio Vargas Foundation, and Universidade Federal 
do ABC), China (China Agricultural University, Beijing), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute, Addis 
Ababa), Ghana (University of Ghana at Legon), Mozambique (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, Maputo), 
Zimbabwe (Research and Development Trust, Harare), the UK (the Institute of Development Studies, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development and the Overseas Development Institute). 
The team includes 25 researchers coming from a range of disciplines including development studies, economics, 
international relations, political science, social anthropology and sociology, but all with a commitment to cross-
disciplinary working. Most papers are thus the result of collaborative research, involving people from different 
countries and from different backgrounds. The papers are the preliminary results of this dialogue, debate, sharing 
and learning. 
As Working Papers they are not final products, but each has been discussed in project workshops and reviewed 
by other team members. At this stage, we are keen to share the results so far in order to gain feedback, and also 
because there is massive interest in the role of Brazil and China in Africa. Much of the commentary on such 
engagements are inaccurate and misleading, or presented in broad-brush generalities. Our project aimed to get 
behind these simplistic representations and find out what was really happening on the ground, and how this is 
being shaped by wider political and policy processes.
The papers fall broadly into two groups, with many overlaps. The first is a set of papers looking at the political 
economy context in Brazil and China. We argue that historical experiences in agriculture and poverty programmes, 
combine with domestic political economy dynamics, involving different political, commercial and diplomatic interests, 
to shape development cooperation engagements in Africa. How such narratives of agriculture and development 
– about for example food security, appropriate technology, policy models and so on - travel to and from Africa is 
important in our analysis. 
The second, larger set of papers focuses on case studies of development cooperation. They take a broadly-defined 
‘ethnographic’ stance, looking at how such engagements unfold in detail, while setting this in an understanding 
of the wider political economy in the particular African settings. There are, for example, major contrasts between 
how Brazilian and Chinese engagements unfold in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, dependant on 
historical experiences with economic reform, agricultural sector restructuring, aid commitments, as well as national 
political priorities and stances. These contrasts come out strikingly when reading across the papers. 
The cases also highlight the diversity of engagements grouped under ‘development cooperation’ in agriculture. 
Some focus on state-facilitated commercial investments; others are more akin to ‘aid projects’, but often with a 
business element; some focus on building platforms for developing capacity through a range of training centres 
and programmes; while others are ‘below-the-radar’ investments in agriculture by diaspora networks in Africa. The 
blurring of boundaries is a common theme, as is the complex relationships between state and business interests 
in new configurations.
This Working Paper series is one step in our research effort and collective analysis. Work is continuing, deepening 
and extending the cases, but also drawing out comparative and synthetic insights from the rich material presented 
in this series. 
Ian Scoones, Project Coordinator, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
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Abstract
The Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration 
Centre (ATDC) in Ethiopia is an aid project on agricultural 
technology cooperation between China and Ethiopia. 
The process of cooperation is the art of improvising on 
the ground when the original project plan doesn’t quite 
match reality. This study analyses the logic behind the 
improvising of implementation on the ground. It found 
that the running of this project is not following project 
management procedures and log-frame indicators but 
is instead based on the experiences of agricultural 
extension in China. Through Chinese experts, as individual 
actors, ATDC brought in the approach of top-down 
planning, assumption of package support and integration 
of commercial functions which can be found in the 
reformed extension system in China. The Chinese experts 
carry this working approach – along with its assumptions 
and principles – to Ethiopia, without considering the lack 
of any parallel institution and culture there at the 
beginning. This results in many challenges for 
implementing the ATDC activities and novel reactions 
by the ATDC experts, which also reflect the individual’s 
working style in the Chinese extension system. Though 
the technologies are still present inside the ATDC after 
many efforts, a request to extend the cooperation phase 
from the Ethiopian side implies an appreciation of the 
approach and its results to some extent. 
Keywords: ATDC, China, Ethiopia, Agricultural Extension
Introduction
We were supposed to be here to demonstrate 
technologies, but not do on-farm trials; however, we 
ended up taking suggestions from various partners, 
and started four demonstration households this 
season with funding from the Department of 
Agriculture in our province in China. 
So said the director of Ethio-China Agricultural 
Demonstration Centre (ATDC) in Ginchi, as he looked 
out at the large area of maize and smaller area of teff in 
the fields around us.
After one and a half hours of driving down an 85km 
road from Addis Ababa, several whitewashed buildings 
with red roofs jump out at you from a distance. 
Surrounding the buildings are fields of green vegetables 
and maize, and Chinese and Ethiopian national flags fly 
in front of a gate with several Ethiopian farm workers 
standing to one side. Running along the perimeter of 
the buildings and the fields there is a barbed-wire fence. 
This is the ATDC. When you enter through the gate you 
first go along a cement road into a small yard. This was 
originally designed for the builders’ temporary 
accommodation and is now used as a kitchen for the 14 
Chinese staff members working here. 
The ATDC in Ethiopia was established to transfer 
agricultural technology from China to Ethiopia via the 
demonstration of Chinese farming approaches to local 
Ethiopians. The project is implemented by Chinese 
agronomists who come from a strong background of 
agricultural extension within China, characterised by 
comprehensive top-down management of information 
and technology dissemination from the highest policy 
goals to the farmers on the ground. They are accustomed 
to doing everything in their power to achieve the goals 
set by the higher levels. They carry this working approach 
– along with its assumptions and principles – to Ethiopia, 
despite the lack of any parallel institution or culture there. 
This results in many challenges for achieving the ATDC’s 
project goals and ultimately demands a lot of 
improvisation by the ATDC experts. Understanding the 
actual context and the realistic potential of the ATDC, 
therefore, requires looking beyond official rhetoric and 
the original project plan. It requires looking at the life 
stories of the individuals involved, their interests, 
motivations, skills, past experiences and networks. This 
research aims to contribute to this through an exploration 
of the experiences of staff at the ATDC, based on empirical 
fieldwork in Ethiopia from November 2013 through 
September 2014. 
The analysis in this paper comes from a Chinese 
perspective exploring the nature of China-Ethiopia 
agricultural cooperation. Some of the researchers 
involved in this project’s wider research programme have 
already conducted similar ethnographic research, not 
only considering the success or failure of a particular 
programme or policy, but also the nature of its process. 
In her research in Senegal, for example, Buckley (2013) 
analysed how distinct repertoires for land management 
are negotiated and reshaped by different subjects in a 
kind of improvised dance, where individuals’ 
improvisations lead to unanticipated project outcomes. 
She argues that a Chinese agricultural management 
regime for African land is simultaneously fraught with 
conflict, while also replete with collaboration benefiting 
smallholder farmers. She shows how Chinese aid workers 
seem to avoid grand discourses or standard solutions. 
Moreover, their approach is practical, often responding 
to recipients’ requests, thus reflecting their development 
experiences but not necessarily a systematic political and 
economic model (Nordtveit 2009). The process of China-
African agricultural cooperation, furthermore, does not 
follow the criteria of Development Assistance Committee 
of The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development in terms of aid to developing countries (Li 
et al. 2014). This research will explore deeper why Chinese 
experts behave in this way, what the logic is behind their 
apparent improvisations and how they understand and 
respond to unexpected situations throughout their work. 
The research was conducted by three researchers from 
the China Agriculture University, with support from UK 
and Ethiopian partners. The authors visited the ATDC 
three times. The first visit in November 2013 was for one 
week, the second stay in July 2014 was for four days and 
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the third visit in September 2014 was for one day. Semi-
structured interviews and participant observations were 
used for communications and data collection. The 
research team also interviewed officials working in the 
Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Financial 
and Economic Development (MoFED), and other Chinese 
experts in other Ethio-China agricultural cooperation 
projects on the first and second visits. During their stays 
at the ATDC, the authors took part in the centre’s daily 
work and spent time together with both Chinese experts 
and Ethiopian workers. After the visits, the authors kept 
in touch with staff via the internet to follow up on their 
progress. However, they were unfortunately unable to 
capture some of the broader activities conducted by the 
centre such as training courses and negotiations with 
local officials. Consequently this study is largely presented 
from the Chinese experts’ perspective. 
Chinese agricultural experiences 
in Ethiopia: Background of the 
ATDC
The Ethio-China ATDC is one of the agricultural 
cooperation projects developed under a political 
arrangement between the two states. There are many 
policy discourses from the Chinese side which show the 
role of agriculture in practicing cooperation between 
China and African countries. In the document ‘China’s 
Africa Policy’ announced on 12 January 2006, a specific 
item of agricultural cooperation appears under the 
economic field in part IV of the cooperation section. It 
says that China intends to further promote its agricultural 
cooperation and exchanges with African nations at 
various levels, with the focus on land development, 
agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food 
security, agricultural machinery and the processing of 
agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify 
cooperation in agricultural technology, organise training 
courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out 
experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology 
projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of the 
China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program. It was 
described again in a white paper on China’s foreign aid 
in 2014 (State Council 2014) that agricultural development 
is crucial to poverty reduction in developing countries. 
China believes that through establishing agricultural 
technology demonstration centres; dispatching 
agricultural experts to provide consultations and conduct 
technical cooperation; and training technical and 
managerial personnel on agriculture in other developing 
countries, China has taken proactive efforts to help other 
developing countries raise their agricultural productivity 
to effectively cope with food crises (State Council 2014; 
Agriculture Exhibition Website 2012).
Within the frame of the policy guidance, concrete 
projects from the Chinese side were initiated including 
15 ATDCs built by China in Africa, committed by the 
premier in 2007 and increased to 20 in the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation in November 2009. At the same time, China 
tried to match the needs from African countries. Entering 
into the twenty-first century, amid multiple global crises, 
agricultural development was revisited and the challenge 
related to agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa was still 
identified as the need to increase food productivity and 
production of smallholder farmers (Dethier and 
Effenberger 2012). A number of problems were addressed 
corresponding to this challenge: property rights, R&D 
for seeds and inputs, irrigation, fertiliser, agricultural 
extension, credit, rural infrastructure, storage and 
connection to markets. In Ethiopia, the government’s 
openness to attracting resources from the international 
development community for agriculture is aligned with 
its general economic development agenda and strategy. 
One of the key areas is capacity development for the 
next generation of R&D professionals, such as supporting 
Ethiopian Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education 
and Training (ATVET) with external teachers and experts. 
This is in keeping with the idea that ‘capacity-building 
of middle-level technical workers is an important factor 
in the drive to enhance productivity, stimulate economic 
competitiveness, and raise people out of poverty’ (World 
Bank 2012: 138). In its recent five-year Agricultural Growth 
Program (AGP), supported by several donors, the aim is 
to promote agricultural production and commercialisation 
and rural small-scale infrastructure in target woredas1 
in the four major regions of Amhara, Oromia, Southern 
Nation Nationalities and People (SNNP) and Tigray. 
The implementation of the ATDCs referred to past 
experiences and lessons of agricultural extension farms 
in African countries funded by the Chinese government. 
Researching on more than 40 years of China’s agricultural 
aid projects in Africa, it was found that there was a vicious 
cycle of starting off fast and achieving some impacts, 
followed by a rapid decline (Yun 2000). Bräutigam (1993) 
found that operating Kpatawee in Liberia as a state farm 
effectively transferred China’s own difficulties with state-
controlled, overmechanised and uneconomic production. 
Even China’s small-scale irrigation techniques, when 
considered separately from the rainfed area of the state 
farm, appear at best only marginally competitive with 
imports, and offer limited promise as a viable farming 
system for rural Liberia. Aid funded China’s enterprises 
to build up ATDCs, with an expectation that the 
motivation of economic benefits will sustain the project 
and ultimately end the repeated recovery actions taken 
by China’s government (Bräutigam 2009). The Chinese 
government also considered its own geographic diversity 
of agricultural production, and assigned the work of 
taking care of ATDCs to executive agencies in different 
provinces throughout China, an approach called ‘one 
province in China corresponding to one African country’ 
(yi sheng bao guo, 以省包国).
With the recommendation of the Guangxi Department 
of Agriculture, Guangxi Bagui Agricultural Science and 
Technology Corporation Limited (Bagui for short) was 
approved by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in 
2007 to be the executive organisation of the Ethio-China 
ATDC. The corporation also implemented a Modern 
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Agricultural Park in Bagui, Guangxi Province in China. 
This was established in 1999 in affiliation with the 
Guangxi Department of Agriculture. With the support 
of the government, 35m yuan was input over more than 
ten years to set up this demonstration park on a total 
area of 25ha. It has five objectives: demonstration of 
modern agricultural facilities; introduction and extension 
of new varieties, new technologies and new research 
results; agricultural science and technology education, 
training and placement; demonstration of agro-industrial 
operation; and demonstration of tourism agriculture. The 
operation is based on different projects, such as an 
Education Base of Science and Technology for Guangxi 
Youth, Demonstration Base of Population of Rural 
Sciences in China, Demonstration Base of Agricultural 
Tourism in China, Demonstration Site of Agricultural 
Tourism in China, and Tourism Site with National AAAA 
Level (the highest standard awarded by the government). 
Eight hundred new varieties have been tested successfully 
and 35 percent of them have been extended to 200,000ha 
throughout the province. The Park also demonstrates 
organic farming and other sustainable agricultural 
practices. It represents a company taking on the mandate 
of technology demonstration to the public, but not the 
mandate of producing profits. And its positioning was 
identified within the agricultural development strategy 
in the province, as can be seen in the Park’s five objectives. 
The ceremony to start construction of the Ethiopian 
ATDC was successfully held on 8 November 2009 
(Guangxi Agriculture Information Website 2009). Both 
the Executive Vice-Minister of the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA) and the Chinese Ambassador to 
Ethiopia expressed that this ATDC is the output of long-
term cooperation between China and Ethiopia, and they 
expect it will play a role in demonstrating modern 
agricultural technologies and promoting incomes of 
smallholder farmers in Ethiopia. In fact, when Bagui got 
this task in 2007, it took part in the ceremony in Beijing 
for sending experts to African countries, which was 
presented by the Chinese Vice-Premier and Ministers of 
Commerce and Agriculture (Bagui Company 2007). After 
2 years of Bagui as the implementer and another 1.5 
years of unexpected issues (discussed in the next section), 
construction formally began in April 2010. The ceremony 
of transferring the completed ATDC to the Ethiopian 
government was held on 19 June 2012 and it went into 
its second phase of technology cooperation in November 
2012. Production fields, a seedling greenhouse, a 
mushroom plant, vegetable storage and bio-gas facilities 
were completed and all in their places when entering 
into this operational phase, as it was designed in 2008. 
However, only 50 percent of production fields were put 
into use and only in the rainy season in the first year of 
this second phase. According to Dong, the current 
director of the centre, 
Exporting vegetable was one component in original 
plan of ATDC. But we could not get the authorized 
qualification to export vegetables. And we were 
not sure of the domestic market, so we did not put 
the fields into use fully. As to another component 
of mushroom demonstration in the plan, since 
there are not mushroom experts in ATDC, so the 
mushroom plant is still empty.
Another explanation from Xia, the horticulture expert, 
is that, 
Previous director did not think about to promote 
the process. After assigning the production tasks in 
the field, he just stayed in the dormitory and never 
came out except meal times. And the area of the 
field even did not put into use fully.
The harvesting of the vegetables faced big problems 
with marketing, according to several experts. Said one, 
‘the vegetables that could not be sold just rotted in the 
field. It was a waste.’ Both the experts and some Chinese 
expressed the same opinions on the first year of 
cooperation at ATDC. From November 2013 the personnel 
structure started to adjust, and the demonstration, 
training and even on-farm trials (which were not originally 
planned) have been designed and carried out. 
When the 52.36ha field is in full use, the off season 
needs about 20 local workers per day, and the peak 
season needs about 50 per day because of the running 
of the irrigation system. In the open field for demonstration 
in July 2014, there are 9ha planted to grass, 1ha of teff, 
14ha of maize, and the remaining 17ha planted to 
vegetables including green pepper, tomato, cucumber, 
bean, k idney bean, broccoli ,  lettuce, edible 
chrysanthemum, spinach, zucchini, cauliflower, Chinese 
leek, celery and asparagus. Seedlings of vegetables and 
some further vegetable production for demonstration 
are housed in 11ha of greenhouses. There are also about 
40 pigs, 120 chickens and 16 cattle. There are four wells 
in the four corners of the field to provide bombing water 
for irrigation in the dry season. The ploughing and 
harrowing of the land is done by three tractors, sometimes 
with the help of a fourth rented from a research centre 
nearby. 
The products are sold to the agricultural markets 
located in Addis Ababa and to mostly Chinese restaurants 
and Chinese companies around Addis Ababa. After going 
through a difficult time in its first year and a half, the 
centre’s annual profits could reach US$120,000, according 
to the current director. 
Human capacity of the ATDC: 
staff and their backgrounds
Though the project is implemented by Bagui as a 
whole, the experts come from different institutes under 
the system of the agricultural department in Guangxi, 
all of which implement extension tasks at the provincial 
level. The Chinese government re-established a strong 
public agricultural extension system at the end of the 
1970s, with more than a million extension staff and more 
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than 90 percent of them working at the county and 
township levels, providing high quality extension services 
(Hu et al. 2009). Because of the staffing burden of this 
system, in the early 1990s, the Chinese government 
formalised the commercial reforms by classifying agents 
by their source of funding: fully funded agents 
(government payroll), partially funded agents 
(government pays part of base salary) and self-funded 
agents (base salary comes from commercial activities 
and grants) (Ibid). Commercial activities such as selling 
fertilisers and seeds were separated from public services 
that are provided by fully funded agents. Normally the 
public services such as trainings and demonstrations are 
jointly set up. Trainings and public advocacy were the 
main methods before the 1990s, and setting up pilot 
households to do on-farm trial and to demonstrate new 
technologies appeared after that in the extension system. 
Furthermore, these are generally complementary 
activities in the villages. Training courses are also 
accompanied by specific programmes supported by the 
government. Experts from different organisations are 
invited to provide trainings for different programmes. 
The design of the ATDC in Ethiopia included the three 
steps of extension, which are experiment, demonstration 
and training. 
There are 14 Chinese staff at the ATDC who are all male 
and came to Ethiopia without family accompaniment. 
Most of them signed a contract for 1.5 years and have a 
month’s holiday at the end of the contract. If both Bagui 
and the individual would like to re-sign the contract, 
then the expert will sign for another 1.5 years and come 
back after the holiday. There were four special cases in 
which experts were sent back to China before finishing 
the first contract and another four came for substitution. 
Two translators were in each contract period.
Except for translators, more or less all of the experts 
have the experience of working in a strong agricultural 
extension system within China or even abroad. At the 
beginning, the director sent to the ATDC was the vice-
director of the Guangxi agricultural extension centre, 
but after one year of poor working results, particularly 
the lack of any training courses at all – which were 
supposed to be key activities in the operation phase – he 
was sent back, and another director from the Foreign 
Funded Projects Office of the Guangxi Department of 
Agriculture was sent to the ATDC in November 2013. 
Actually, there are only four staff originally from Bagui: 
one is a translator who just graduated from the English 
programme at Guangxi University before being hired 
for the ATDC project; one is a horticulture expert who 
worked in Bagui demonstration park and is responsible 
for vegetable experiments and field production; another 
is the horticulture expert who was hired by Bagui as the 
manager responsible for the project abroad and came 
to Ethiopia in 2008 to supervise the construction process; 
and the last is responsible for administrative issue. 
Three of the staff had experiences working outside of 
China before. Director Dong worked for a bilateral 
agricultural project in Cambodia extending bio-gas 
technology from China to local farmers and got satisfying 
results. Horticultural expert Yu worked for an Indonesian-
Chinese company to initiate vegetable production in 
Indonesia for half a year. Livestock expert Ya worked for 
a joint venture of Guangxi International Cooperation 
Company and Chinese Construction Company together 
with Gambia Development Bank from 1987-1994 to take 
care of livestock there and sell the products to local hotels. 
For those who did not have experience working 
abroad, some of them had strong capacity in extension 
in Guangxi. Shang, who is responsible for maize breeding 
and demonstration, had almost 20 years experience in 
seed breeding and duplication in Guangxi. The 
agricultural engineer Tian worked for county agricultural 
machinery bureau, also for around 20 years.
Since Bagui is administered by the Department of 
Agriculture, the announcement of enrolling staff to send 
to the ATDC project was distributed widely in this system, 
including to various divisions of the Department and 
agricultural bureaus and colleges affiliated with the 
Department. Some staff applied very positively and some 
were recommended by their institutes. After the selection, 
the Department still worried that people would not like 
to go abroad if the time duration was too long, so the 
agreement was signed for 1.5 years with an allowance 
to go back home for vacation for one month at the end 
and discuss continuation of the agreement. All staff, 
including translators, are signed under the name of 
experts and can get the corresponding subsidies for 
experts, starting at US$600 per month for a junior expert, 
including translators. 
None of the staff working in the ATDC received formal 
training in foreign aid prior to arrival in Ethiopia. ‘There 
might be some regulations in our agreements, but we 
are not sure’, expressed some staff who arrived at ATDC 
in November 2012. ‘We thought we did not receive any 
training because we were here late. Now we just know 
that those who arrived at the beginning of technology 
cooperation phase did not receive any training either’, 
said the director and two other staff who arrived in 
November 2013, during a chat among the staff in 
December 2013.
The knowledge and principles of taking on the ATDC’s 
tasks have been introduced in different ceremonies 
celebrating its start, its progress and its accomplishments. 
After identifying the experts, there was a workshop 
organised by the Guangxi Department of Agriculture on 
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Table 1 Chinese Experts working in the ATDC2
Name Age Expertise A r r i v a l  t i m e /
departure time
Previous experiences of 
working abroad
Original position and base 
before coming to ATDC
Dong 44 Director Nov 2013 Cambodia, working for 
three years for extending 
bio-gas technology to 
smallholder farmers
Official in Guangxi Department 
of Agriculture
Nan 31 Accountant Nov 2012/July 2013 None Accountant in Bagui
Xi 50 Horticulture and
logistics
2008; Nov 2012/July 
2014
None Staff in an Agricultural Bureau, 
senior agronomist of Bagui and 
manager in construction phase 
of ATDC in 2008-2010
Bei 56 Well and water 
bombing
Nov 2012 None Engineer  in  a  fac tor y in 
Dongguan county, Guangdong 
Province
Shang 41 Maize breeding Nov 2012 None Senior researcher in Guangxi 
Seeds Management Station
Xia 38 Horticulture Nov 2012 I n d o n e s i a ,  i n i t i a t i n g 
vegetable production for a 
company but through 
bilateral cooperation
Teacher in Guangxi Agricultural 
Vocational College
Zuo 25 Translator 2010/Dec 2013 None G r a d u a te d  f ro m  E n g l i s h 
Undergraduate programme, and 
hired by Bagui because of this 
ATDC project in 2010
You 22 Translator Nov 2012/July 2014 None Master student in Guangxi 
University
Qian 50 Mechanisation Nov 2012/Dec 2013 None Staff in Nanning agricultural 
mechanisation extension station
Hou 50 Veterinary Nov 2012 None Staff in an agricultural bureau
Gao 34 Animal 
husbandry
Nov 2012 None Teacher in an agricultural 
vocational college
Di 38 Horticulture Nov 2012 None Staff in Bagui
Nei 50 Horticulture Nov 2013 None Staff in a county agricultural 
bureau in Guilin
Wai 42 Horticulture and 
administration
Nov 2013 None, but experiences of 
f o r e i g n  a i d  p r o j e c t 
management in China
Staff in a county agricultural 
bureau in Guilin
Tian 44 Agricultural 
engineer
July 2014 None Staff in Pubei County agricultural 
machinery bureau in Guangxi
Ya 56 Animal 
husbandry
July 2014 Gambia, working for a 
company for 8 years
Teacher in Guangxi Agricultural 
Vocational College
Hai 22 Translator Feb 2014 None Masters student in Guangxi 
University
Jiao 22 Translator July 2014 None Masters student in Guangxi 
University
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19 November 2012. According to the ATDC staff and news 
reports on the websites of Guangxi Agricultural Vocational 
College(Chen 2012) and MOFCOM (ECC 2012), the 
contents of the workshop were an introduction of the 
structure and functions of the ATDC by the centre’s 
director; a discussion of management and operation, 
sustainability, training and demonstration of the ATDC; 
and the security of experts’ living and working in the 
ATDC. The director of the Department of Agriculture 
emphasised that the experts should realise the important 
implications of foreign aid. They should improve the 
quality of foreign aid work through their efforts and 
innovation, and improve its reputation and impacts 
through learning and good management. The ‘innovation’ 
was not explained or discussed further. ‘Good 
management’ was included in the statement without 
training on what it entails. One ATDC staff member 
understood that ‘at least the director has to know what 
ATDC should do and the regulations and institution 
should be obeyed by all staff’. After arriving in Ethiopia, 
the experts took part in the meeting arranged by the 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s (ECC) office of 
the Chinese Embassy in Ethiopia on 26 November 2012. 
The counsellor introduced Ethiopia’s general situation; 
emphasised the political and economic significance of 
the ATDC cooperation project; and charged the experts’ 
group to come up with a concrete and feasible working 
plan and take action soon. He encouraged the experts 
to put their fullest efforts into making the ATDC a model 
of experimental research, technology demonstration and 
extension and technology training, in order to let the 
Ethiopian people feel the practical results of technology 
cooperation. At the same time, he reminded them that 
everybody should obey foreign aid regulations and 
foreign affairs disciplines, as well as local laws, cultural 
customs and religious customs. He also reminded 
everybody to pay attention to personal safety and 
production safety; to maintain harmonisation and 
solidarity; and to uphold a good image of foreign aid 
personnel. 
As in the aforementioned two activities, there was 
guidance for the ATDC in terms of foreign aid projects, 
but there were no concrete guidelines for its 
implementation and there were no concrete requirements 
for individual experts. Learning by doing became the 
major approach for the ATDC to move ahead, which is 
actually the approach that China has taken overall for its 
engagement with Africa (Buckley, 2013; Li, 2014). While 
individual experiences in China’s agriculture extension 
system guided the practice of experts in the ATDC, there 
were adjustments made according to the local situation, 
which is also a characteristic of doing extension in new 
terms in China.
Transfer of China’s agricultural 
extension system
Though a hybrid extension system including public 
and non-public parts has been emerging in China since 
entering the twenty-first century, a discouraging 
phenomenon is that the state administrative 
management system for the public parts has not yet 
changed in practice, and is characterised by a traditional 
‘planned plus professional’ style (Li et al. 2009: 185-190). 
Most of the ATDC staff worked in this system and have 
had to practice their learning from the system in China 
without other concrete guidelines for agricultural 
cooperation between China and Ethiopia. In the 
management regulations of the ATDC we can see the 
mark of extension work in China, where there are very 
comprehensive requirements for staff. It has a team 
leader, group leader and personnel of the planting 
demonstration group and livestock group, administrative 
personnel, marketing personnel, water and electricity 
personnel, machinery personnel and translators. Specific 
experts in planting and livestock are responsible for their 
whole set of work including experiments, production, 
lectures and field guidance in training.
In the ATDC, changes to the demonstration process 
as well as concrete technologies are presented. The 
demonstration process includes the design of the ATDC, 
the implementation of activities and the communication 
between the Chinese and Ethiopian sides, which cannot 
be found in the legitimised policy documents but are 
built of individual interests, academic and practical 
backgrounds, understandings of Ethiopian agriculture 
and its R&D system, and communication skills. In other 
words, the ATDC brought in China’s extension experiences 
through those individual experts who had the most 
understanding of China’s conditions but little 
understanding of Ethiopian conditions, so there is a 
disjoint between official rhetoric on both sides and the 
realities that Chinese aid workers face. As one teacher at 
Allege College said, 
The R&D system in Ethiopia is very poor in terms 
of its effectiveness of disseminating technologies 
to the farmers. There is a strict official procedure in 
fact, but the problem is that it is not practiced in the 
reality. I have been working in extension system in 
Hunan, China for several decades, and we have very 
strong linkage with farmers. But teachers here could 
not provide the practical skills to the students that 
are expected to do the field work with farmers. So 
we have to enhance their skills at that direction for 
their contribution to R&D system.
Although the ATDC’s technologies are quite distant 
from the local Ethiopian situation and the gap between 
demonstration and dissemination has been largely 
ignored by policymakers on both sides, one extension 
official in the Ethiopian MoA expressed, ‘ATDC has 
significant meaning because it is our future.’ 
With this as the future’s prospect, Chinese experts are 
trying their best to transfer their experiences in China’s 
extension system while continuously complaining of the 
different and not so compatible institutional, physical 
and cultural environments in Ethiopia. 
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Improvising a new scene in a 
top-down frame
In China, the government sets objectives every year 
at the national level for types of crops and production 
goals, and the corresponding extension plan goes 
through various levels. Grassroots extensionists at the 
township level follow the county plan that is assigned 
from upper levels (MoA and MoF 2012). Although the 
extension workers work quite closely with farmers, they 
are ultimately accountable to the State, not to the 
farmers, so they take those high-level objectives and 
consider the farmers’ needs only inasmuch as this is 
necessary to accomplish their tasks. It is a top-down 
approach, not directly based on the needs of the farmers 
themselves. Entering into the 1990s, extension 
approaches were diversified and new styles appeared 
like the Experts’ Yard, Demonstration Park and 
Demonstration Household, but the focus remained 
advanced-technology oriented and treated scientists’ 
knowledge as superior to indigenous knowledge for 
achieving the goals of food security and agricultural 
structural adjustment in China (Kuang 2012). 
Since the construction phase of the ATDC, this type 
of thinking accumulated from systematic customs in 
China was brought in and faced the different realities of 
Ethiopia. There are three phases in general for building 
up China’s ATDCs in Africa: a two-year construction phase, 
three-year technology cooperation phase and several-
year sustainable development phase. Normally the 
agreement says that the third phase will be discussed 
between China and the host African country to decide 
who will be in charge of it, except for two countries – 
South Africa and Ethiopia – who insisted that the third 
phase be transferred fully to them from the Chinese side. 
The agreement between the Ethiopian and Chinese 
governments was signed on 30 May 2008. 
Unexpected issues meant that the land mentioned in 
the agreement, 30km southwest of Addis Ababa with 
wells, could not be acquired due to the farmers who rent 
the land not agreeing to the transfer, so the Ethiopian 
MoA tried to look for a new venue. After almost one year 
they suggested the new venue, a piece of land the 
government had previously readied for attracting 
investment 85km east of the capital. Then the construction 
started in November 2009. However, it was found that 
this land did not have wells and had volcanic soils not 
suitable for agriculture. Bagui then suggested that the 
Ethiopian MoA dig four wells at the corners of the land; 
otherwise, the irrigation according to the previous plan 
could not be set up and this would influence the whole 
design. 
It would cost around US$10,000-15,000 to dig one 
well, and the Ethiopian side did not initially agree. ‘You 
could not imagine that the government in China did not 
provide a most accessible place for demonstration and 
did not arrange infrastructure very well, but it happened 
here in Ethiopia’, said the representative of Bagui, An, 
who was the senior agronomist of Bagui at that time and 
finished his contract and returned to China in July 2014. 
An started to write a request letter and asked for help 
from the Chinese Embassy and ECC’s office to submit it 
to Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of 
Ethiopia. ‘It would increase the budget if not getting the 
support from Ethiopian government,’ An explained of 
the process. ‘It should be very difficult to do that and it 
was already far behind the schedule, so ECC was also 
urgently paying more attention on it’. 
Finally, the Ethiopian government agreed to dig the 
wells, through ‘the director of extension department of 
MoA moving other budget in,’ according to the Ethiopian 
focal point of the ATDC. As for the problem of volcanic 
soil, the ATDC introduced soil improvement as one 
technology to be demonstrated that was not in the 
original plan.
The construction finally started following the design 
that had been done by Bagui in 2008. The design was 
led by Xi, who had experience implementing the Bagui 
demonstration park. It combined many advanced 
technologies currently used in China, such as ‘cropping+ 
livestock + bio-gas’, agricultural mechanisation, plastic 
mulching cultivation, industrial seedlings, facilities 
cultivation, water-saving irrigation, rational intensive 
planting and fertilising and comprehensive technology 
of raising livestock and poultry. 
These technologies did not match the local situation 
at all. Local conditions were no irrigation systems, no 
matching funds for mechanisation and even different 
kinds of vegetables produced by farmers. But according 
to the agronomist Shang, ‘they are a direction and local 
people could learn first. Like in Nanning, every year we 
organised demonstration of new varieties of crops in our 
experimental station, and visitors could select the ones 
they like.’ However, the difficulties the ATDC faced still 
exist. While accomplishing their tasks, the extensionists 
have to find ways to both follow the project design and 
adjust it to the local situation and farmers’ interests. 
The turning point of the adjustment was the change 
of the director. After one year’s implementation, the 
previous director of the ATDC was sent back to China 
and Dong came for substitution in November 2013. Dong 
had been an administrator in China responsible for 
foreign projects aided by bilateral and international 
organisations such as the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). He was informed by the 
Department of Agriculture in Guangxi to prepare to come 
to Ethiopia to take the leadership of the ATDC. At the 
same time, he was hired as the vice-manager in general 
of Bagui and was sent out in the name of the new 
manager of Bagui. Though now identified as per new 
tasks assigned in the ATDC, the major roles of staff are 
still influenced by their previous working experiences. 
In the director’s words,
Working Paper 128 www.future-agricultures.org10
I am representative of Bagui just for temporary and 
will go back to Department of Agriculture after the 
end of this cooperation phase. I had the experiences 
of working on development projects and at least 
we have to take the activities that have already 
been planned. I did not have any idea on Ethiopian 
agriculture upon arrival. There were already many 
critiques on ATDC. First two considerations from my 
thinking are: to make the land fully used and to find 
something more appropriate for local people’. 
This new director has a significant advantage in his 
experiences of development project implementation, 
which is rare among ATDC staff and helpful for him to 
change the passive situation quickly.
During our visit to Dong in the first two weeks of his 
arrival in 2013, we observed that he was studying 
agricultural structures in different regions of Ethiopia 
and focusing on maize and teff research work. Though 
only searching on the internet, such as from Ethiopian 
websites and Google Scholar, he found much relevant 
information that he did not know before and he even 
presented us with one article on the System of Rice 
Intensification (SRI) applied in teff production (Berhe and 
Zena, 2008).  Dong said, 
I want to try teff. Farmers here are all broadcasting 
the seeds with low-yield varieties. We could try to 
find several households to do the trial. The staff in 
Ambo research institutes also said that they had 
some research results in the aspect but not extended 
yet, I guess there are some problems. Anyway we 
could plant some, at least we could sell it out. 
Additionally, I found this article in English on the 
web-site of Google and found there is big potential 
to increase its yield.
At that moment, he also contacted Ambo research 
institutes 10km away to talk about their new varieties of 
maize, explaining, ‘maize is produced in farmers’ lands 
as well and it could be direct food for them, so we might 
try to demonstrate higher yield varieties with more 
adaptive to local conditions.’
Among other planned technologies, bio-gas was not 
put into use. In a 2013 internal report on adjusting the 
design for demonstration,  Dong wrote that the altitude 
and weather are not suitable for bio-gas, and the customs 
of local people raising livestock were not conducive to 
accumulating the manure that is crucial for bio-gas, so 
the idea was given up. ‘Bio-gas is well applied in our 
province but it was not appropriate in Ethiopia where 
the temperature is low, like in most places in China, 
bio-gas does not work,’ explained the manager 
responsible for the construction phase, ‘but we only 
brought this idea from our working experiences in 
Guangxi and there was only one person for some time 
then and could not think so much’. As for those vegetables 
that are only preferred by the Chinese, the adjustment 
was continuing to plant while looking for more market 
channels. Teff planting was integrated into the production 
plan in the rainy season of 2014. The focal point of the 
Ethiopian MoA claimed that local people are eager for 
mushrooms, but this has not been demonstrated in the 
ATDC – though it was in the original plan. Dong said that 
he did not know why there is not mushroom 
demonstration as per planned activities, but he would 
consider local people’s requirement for mushroom.
After another eight months, we came back to the ATDC 
in July 2014 and found many changes. Two training 
courses with almost 100 people have been done. About 
70 farmers being trained asked for maize seeds from 
ATDC. All of the land was planted, though still with a 
large area of vegetables mostly from China. Local varieties 
of maize and teff were growing very well. The centre had 
started to produce mushrooms as well with the help of 
a Chinese mushroom expert sent to Ethiopia through 
another agricultural cooperation project called the 
Agricultural Technology Experts project. And there were 
four demonstration farmers starting to plant maize using 
the mulching technology that the ATDC had 
demonstrated and trained in. Explained Dong, with much 
more confidence than the previous November, 
It is easy to complete what planned, such as 
experiments, training courses and participants. 
We are not originally required to do on-farm trial. 
However, since the evaluation team from MOFCOM 
and Ethiopian MoA all suggested setting up the 
demonstration households for extending the new 
technologies, following the model of agriculture 
extension work particularly in early reform period 
of China, we started to set up four of them and are 
applying for the support of around 100,000 yuan 
from Department of Agriculture in Guangxi.
With the purpose of mobilising more information on 
current research progress and some existing facilities, 
the ATDC also contacted Ambo research institutes for 
exchange in the future. The maize varieties at the ATDC 
are from Ambo, and the 120hp tractors are also rented 
from Ambo at the price of 125 Birr (US$6) per day for 20 
days during the land preparation period. The ATDC focal 
point in the Ethiopian extension department now said, 
‘we have very good communication with current Chinese 
director of ATDC, so the activities are going very well. 
Previous director could not speak English, so it was 
difficult to get correct and timely exchange through 
translation.’ The ATDC had even opened discussions with 
the China to Overseas Construction Group Co. Ltd 
(COCGC) for its management after the cooperation phase 
concluded in 2015. The Ethiopian MoA also proposed 
continued cooperation with China for sustaining the 
ATDC in the following three years after 2015, together 
with Bagui, the ECC and COCGC. 
The adjustment of this dynamic pattern is based very 
much on direct guidance from the upper level, but not 
a set monitoring and evaluation system, which is one 
characteristic of extension projects in China as well. The 
results of the ATDC are not evaluated by a formal 
monitoring and evaluation procedure but by pressure 
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from different parties, including the Ethiopian side and 
Chinese side. 
From the Ethiopian side, the ATDC was expected to 
present a future vision, as the contact person in the 
Ethiopian MoA expressed: ‘ATDC shows the future of 
Ethiopian agriculture, scale -production with 
infrastructure and mechanisation, and we can’t stop at 
backward production situation.’ Therefore, the tractors 
are expected to work well and the land to be utilised on 
a large scale – otherwise the vision will not be realised. 
From the Chinese side, simultaneously, the direct 
administrative organisations are sources of pressure. Led 
by MOFCOM and organised by the MoA of China, ATDCs 
were evaluated with detailed indicators in 2013 by the 
MoA’s Foreign Economic Cooperation Centre. The results 
at least showed the ATDCs doing something related to 
experiments, demonstration and extension. Staff of the 
ATDC in Ethiopia faced an embarrassing situation due 
to only working on vegetable production, with mainly 
vegetables from China, with no training at all, and no 
mention of sustainability. The change of director was the 
solution, followed later on by the change of the structure 
of demonstration, though without changing the basic 
pattern of production with vegetables and maize as the 
main crops under conditions of irrigation and 
mechanisation.
Individual work experiences and personalities got the 
projects going in a workable direction, with a push from 
upper levels. In Dong’s account, the Chinese Ministers 
of Agriculture and Commerce were in a very crucial 
position for guiding the direction of the ATDC’s 
development. For example, after the latter Minister said 
that commercialising was not the purpose of the ATDC, 
and the MOFCOM evaluation group suggested that the 
demonstration farmers are necessary, the ATDC started 
to set up demonstration farmers. This process is just like 
in the frame of government structures in China: when 
policies are not clear enough to be practical for individuals’ 
work, direct criticism and guidance from authorities are 
effective. At the same time, individual capacity and 
personality decide the flexibility of mobilising resources 
to fulfil the changed direction, to turn the plan again 
into concrete activities.
The pattern of transferring the extension system could 
not succeed without specific outputs of its technology 
demonstration, so for making the ATDC functional, a 
leader with plentiful experiences of extension and 
management is very important. That is why the change 
of personnel was the only solution in the existing frame 
which could lead to changing responsible organisations 
if current one could not fulfil the operational requirements. 
In this approach, individual capacity is quite critical 
because unexpected situations require personal adaptive 
reactions. The new director knows the importance of 
individual capacity very well from his working experiences 
of Chinese foreign aid in Cambodia. After getting 
employed for the ATDC, he started to recommend new 
experts who would like to come to Ethiopia together 
with him, and he has also been concerned with their 
qualifications in working practically. The agricultural 
engineer and livestock expert have changed. After the 
first round of contracts of all the staff, almost 50 percent 
were shifted. 
Developing farmers’ potential in 
demonstration through package 
support 
The extension system in China is top-down, but 
includes requirements for close relationships between 
the extension workers and the farmers, which does create 
room for input from the farmers. Furthermore, extension 
does not mean only demonstration and training, but 
also some funds that provide ‘package support’ for 
farmers. For making this support happen, the MoA, who 
is the direct administrative government organisation of 
the extension system, and Ministry of Finance, who 
manages public agricultural expenses, make subsidy 
policies to arrange physical subsidies such as seeds, 
breeders, fertilisers, chemical pesticides and fodder for 
agriculture technology demonstration households to 
apply new varieties and other new technologies (MoA 
and MoF 2012). Demonstration parks are different from 
demonstration households, but with the package 
support these two can be linked with each other. In this 
system, extension workers are required to organise 
farmers to come to the demonstration park, to select 
farmers to do demonstration, and to go to the village 
providing field guidance. 
The idea of ‘package support’ was then carried out 
with the demonstration centre setup, which means that 
the training course should be packed together, technical 
staff should go to the farmers if needed, and the farmers 
should come to the centre to visit by themselves or in 
visits organised by the government. 
The training courses were planned in the agreement 
and it was mentioned that the Ethiopian side would be 
responsible for organising the participants and providing 
transportation funds. This organisational arrangement 
met the Chinese experts’ expectation, which was that 
they would simply provide the knowledge and field 
guidance to participants. However, it did not go smoothly 
because the extension department of the Ethiopian MoA 
could not send the participants as planned. 
When the new director came in November 2013, he 
realised that he needed to facilitate this process. He 
organised an internal meeting to propose a training plan 
and went to the MoA to discuss this with the focal point. 
‘Selection of trainees is the mandate of Ethiopian side, 
which is written in MOU,’ the new director said. ‘We could 
not just go to the farmers to invite them here. It is not 
allowed either for the farmers coming to ATDC directly 
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by themselves.’ He insisted on communicating with the 
director and focal point of the MoA, so only ten days 
after his arrival in Ethiopia, the first training date was set 
as 4 September 2013. However, this was not the end of 
the effort: the dates were delayed again and again, and 
success in holding the training courses was only achieved 
after 4 months of waiting. To enrol some workers to be 
trainees was also the idea of the new director for 
connecting the training courses with practice. At the 
same time, the Ethiopian MoA combined these two 
training courses with Agricultural Growth Program 
activities, so the issue of transportation costs was solved. 
They also invited the Chinese expert Zhao working in 
the Ethiopian MoA to provide lectures on plastic mulching 
technology, an AGP technology, to the trainees. 
Even with the top-down character discussed above, 
the Chinese staff are highly committed to the tasks they 
are assigned and keen to accomplish them despite lack 
of salary and many challenges and hardships. Backing 
this up is the system of incentives and rewards for 
researchers and extensionists (Li et al. 2009). The staff 
accomplishing assigned tasks can be proud of being 
advanced personnel or advanced Communist Party 
members, appraised at the national level. The 
extensionists will persist and experiment in every way 
possible in order to achieve the goals set for them by 
the higher levels. If they can see even a small amount of 
progress towards this, with lots of effort put in, they can 
feel accomplishment and pride in this way. The most 
significant example of this was in the late 1970s, when 
hybrid varieties of maize, rice and wheat were introduced 
to farmers by the extensionists. There was much 
resistance at the beginning; for example, villagers were 
used to eating products of the old varieties and not sure 
of the quality and taste of introduced varieties. The 
extension workers had low salaries at that moment but 
they persisted and went to the villages again and again. 
Some of them invited the technicians who are close to 
the farmers to introduce the new technologies in a local 
expression. After all of this effort, they were very happy 
to see eventual acceptance by the farmers.
In China, the local extension agencies cover lots of 
areas and take many activities for extension projects. 
Those Chinese experts coming to the ATDC expected 
the same conditions. In reality, follow-up is not so ideal 
because ‘the grass root extensionist do not have enough 
conditions of communication and transportation like 
mobile phone, bike and daily working expenses; and the 
salary of around 1,000 Birr [US$48] and 3-4 hours for 
going to and returning from field could not be incentive 
for encouraging extension workers,’ as one expert in the 
Agricultural Technology Experts project commented. The 
same situation is described in the literature, such as by 
Dais et al. (2010), who found that basic infrastructure 
and resources at the kebele3  and woreda level remain a 
major constraint, particularly in relation to operating 
funds: the vast majority of kebele-level Farmer Training 
Centres (FTCs) do not have operating equipment or 
inputs to pursue typical extension activities on 
demonstration farms. Though the Chinese experts do 
not know much about FTCs or cooperatives, they do not 
think these organizations could play an important role 
except with some advanced farmers, and they feel that 
the upper levels should take more of a mandate to make 
dissemination work, as in China. At the same time, the 
Ethiopian MoA has coordinated many issues in the 
technology cooperation phase and the experts think that 
this coordination is sufficient. This includes introducing 
Alage College to the ATDC for picking piglet breeds from 
Alage; contacting Ambo research institutes to provide 
improved local varieties of maize; facilitating Ginchi 
Woreda government to recommend employees; and 
soliciting various data on soil and meteorology from local 
technical stations. 
Making friends with farmers or keeping a specific 
linkage with farmers is one of the working approaches 
of extension work in China. Currently, the demonstration 
household method is emphasised again by way of a ‘ratio 
policy’, which means that there should be a number of 
farmers in demonstration households to correspond to 
a certain number of grassroots extensionists. For example, 
An county in Sichuan required the ratio of 10:1, or at least 
ten demonstration households to each extensionist,4 and 
that the extensionist should stay in their village of 
responsibility for at least 150 days per year to provide 
technology guidance and other services in specific 
planting times, times of emergency or any time when 
farmers are in need. Normally they live in the houses of 
village leaders, and it’s natural for them to understand 
the farmers’ and villages’ situations after living together. 
The idea of equality is always present as well, so the 
extentionists do not consider themselves to be at a higher 
level than the farmers. The format of the demonstration 
centre is only one component of the extension process 
in China, so it is supposed to be combined with follow-up. 
In a different situation like Ethiopia, there is not the 
same system as in China. There is an FTC in each kebele, 
which is a platform that is supposed to provide training 
and demonstration for the surrounding farmers. FTCs 
are within the extension system, and three extensionists 
responsible for each kebele are expected to make full 
use of the FTC, at least theoretically. However, the reality 
is that the FTC cannot be used unless there are projects 
running in the area, so out of about 8,489 FTCs established 
at the kebele level, roughly 2,500 were reported to be 
fully functional at one time (MoA 2009). Thus these are 
not the same as demonstration households in China, 
which are always practicing agriculture even without 
material support from the government. 
Therefore, although the ATDC did not do on-farm trials, 
several Chinese experts went to the farmers and made 
friends with them, while providing local improved 
varieties of maize. They gradually came to understand 
the local situation while approaching the farmers, as Wai 
explained. 
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We have to work with our employee, local people, 
every day, so I have learned a few Oromo language. 
I do not stay at home in the weekends, but visit 
local people’s home, not for work but for personal 
interests of understanding local culture. However, 
for more efficient work, we also need to understand 
our employed workers in ATDC. Now there are two 
workers who just graduated from the universities 
and I will train them to become group heads. Our 
production is quite different from local customs. 
Farmers around seldom plant vegetables, and 
the vegetables ATDC planted are quite different 
from local ones. Now maize production with local 
improved varieties and package field management 
technologies is quite suitable to the farmers.
Changing the behaviour of the farmers for accepting 
new technologies is also one of the expectations of the 
experts influenced by their previous experiences. 
Whatever situation the experts have faced, they all 
assume that local people need the highest and best 
available technology to produce high yields. In China, 
new varieties played an important role in increasing 
yields, and extending high-yield varieties achieved 
significant effectiveness in quite a short time, with many 
efforts to persuade farmers to change their habit of using 
local varieties. Those who achieved such successful 
results in China are also very optimistic in Ethiopia. As Xi 
said, 
We are here to accomplish our tasks of bringing 
advanced technologies from China. Varieties are 
most important, but there is also modern planting 
pattern, intensive and meticulous cultivation, for 
making high yield happen. If you look around here, 
you could not find even ridge planting and they just 
broadcast sowing. There is big potential to increase 
their productivity’.
At the same time, the experts realised it would take 
time to adjust farmers’ farming customs to correspond 
to these new patterns. Wai commented, 
Though they work on farm since very young, those 
activities are most simple, for example, cattle raising 
is just grazing and needs only looking at the cattle; 
another example is they never weeding. You said 
that you saw their weeding, but that is not weeding, 
they just pull up weeds for feeding cattle. They do 
not know how to do ploughing and harrowing, so 
they are also slow when working in ATDC.
 
Water saving irrigation is also one of the technologies 
that is supposed to be demonstrated. Local farmers’ 
conditions are not good enough to build up irrigation 
systems, and it seems quite difficult to extend this 
demonstrated technology and have it be accepted by 
local farmers. However, experts in the ATDC think there 
is a solution, if the farmers have a willingness to learn. 
As one expert said, 
Yes, many places here do not have irrigation facilities. 
But if they do want to learn something, they can dig 
a well by themselves for solving the problems of 
irrigation. Around ATDC, you can get water after 
digging only 20 meters, even without money, they 
could dig well with their own labour. In domestic 
China, you can see almost every household has one 
well if there is any possibility for getting water.
However, with so much confidence in the possible 
use of these technologies, the different needs of farmers 
remain. After the current trainings and other methods 
of making friends with farmers, there are only farmers 
asking for maize seeds but none asking for irrigation 
technology guidance, for cattle fattening technology or 
for mulching technology. Four households were selected 
as demonstration households, chosen from among the 
leaders of working groups at the ATDC who were working 
very positively and taking part in the trainings already 
and whose homes were not far from the centre. They are 
doing demonstration of maize production with package 
technologies of locally recommended varieties, mulching, 
fertilising underground (施底肥), weeding and second 
time fertilising (追肥), all of which were practiced at the 
ATDC. Though there were some existing improvements 
to maize production in these demonstration households, 
the process was pushed by the experts, who guided 
implementation and provided plastic cover and fertilisers. 
Shang was responsible for guiding one household; when 
Shang was in China for annual leave, this household did 
not do fertilisation as scheduled, and just waited for 
Shang’s return for the second time fertilisation. Because 
of this, it was late and missed the appropriate time. 
Creating opportunities in a wider 
system
In the extension system in China mentioned above, 
the structure has been reformed since 2006, separating 
the functions of public services and commercial services 
into two parallel institutions. Public services include the 
introduction, trial and demonstration of new 
technologies; monitoring, prediction, prevention and 
management of diseases and pests of crops and trees, 
animal diseases and agricultural disasters; quality security 
check and monitoring of agricultural product processing; 
monitoring of resources and inputs application; water 
management and services of anti-flood and drought; 
services of agricultural public information; and training 
and education. Operational services include the supply 
of production materials of seeds, fertilisers, plastic covers 
and others; animal disease treatment; and post-harvest 
services. The public services were the mandates of local 
extension institutes of the government and the 
operational mandates were encouraged to be taken on 
by the commercial sector (State Council 2006).
On one hand, the approach of Bagui implementing 
the ATDC is providing public services. As the Chinese 
Agricultural Minister Han mentioned during his visit in 
Ethiopia, ‘we are not here for making money but provide 
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support to local agriculture and local people.’ On the 
other hand, the ATDC was expected from the China side 
to be able to get operational capacity for its sustainability 
(Tang et al. 2015), that is to look for funding sources for 
its functioning after the government phases out support, 
to avoid its collapse. For those experts carrying on the 
tasks of demonstration and extension, it is difficult to 
accomplish the tasks of producing profits at the same 
time, but it could be realistic, since there were such 
experiences in China. Shang had long-term working 
experiences in Guangxi Seed Company and then Guangxi 
Seed Management Station. He expressed this possibility 
in this way: 
I have worked for a seed experimental station for 
more than 20 years. The additional value of seeds 
in China is quite high because seeds are with high 
demanding in agricultural production. It is also 
possible to do similar work here if everybody is 
positive to cooperate, for example, machines’ 
playing roles and watering in time. We could do 
seeds selection and breeding, and even production 
of hybrid seeds. We could teach local technicians the 
process of breeding, but they need to do follow-up 
by themselves.
Because it needs a term of ten years on average and 
a minimum of five to six years for breeding, extension of 
seed technology seems not so reasonable. However, for 
those technologies that could be feasible to extend in 
the short term, the possible benefits that could be 
brought to the ATDC are not so significant. Water-saving 
technology, mulching technology and plastic film 
technology are very easy to learn, and there is a big gap 
of irrigation in the dry season. ‘It is very easy to access to 
water in highland here, so it is possible to extend water-
saving technology after application in dry season, ‘ Shang 
said. 
However, the Ethiopian side only expected the public 
functions of ATDC. ‘It is government asset that is supposed 
to provide public services and it is not allowed to make 
profits from it,’ the director of MoA explained. The ATDC 
has to sell produce, pork and poultry in order to support 
its operations, particular after the cooperation phase. 
Even the focal point for the ATDC on the Ethiopian side 
understands this arrangement that the produce from 
the centre will be sold to fund part of its operations. But 
marketing isn’t part of the official cooperation, and this 
was not included in the terms and conditions for the 
ATDC’s operations. Therefore, the ATDC can’t be registered 
as a company or issue receipts for sales, which creates 
real problems for people who want to buy their meat 
and produce. A Chinese restaurant owner one author 
spoke to complained about the haphazard nature of their 
operations (gan de bu gui fan,干得不规范) and about 
the lack of receipts, which makes it virtually impossible 
for him to buy anything from them, as he always need 
to have a paper trail. Furthermore, the ATDC can’t sell 
live animals directly to potential buyers like the restaurant; 
a special license is required to slaughter animals, which 
only slaughterhouses like the ones in Debrezeit have. 
The ATDC is also not allowed to open a store to sell directly 
to potential customers; foreigners can’t open stores or 
trading firms themselves, but have to go through a local 
partner. Naturally, sales were not going well and director 
Dong complained about this. 
This mismatch between ATDC expectations and actual 
Ethiopian realities forces them to invent ways to cope. 
Firstly they seek out potential clients for current 
production, and in the adjustment report of the ATDC a 
clear cost-benefit calculation was done for each vegetable 
they are producing, considering Chinese consumers 
around Ginchi and in Addis. Secondly, they produce 
maize and teff which are easy to sell to surrounding 
farmers. Thirdly, they discussed with potential 
implementers in China taking over ATDC’s management 
after the cooperation phase, such as COCGC, who has 
set up Wara Agricultural Park and Kebbi and will build 
up a modern comprehensive agricultural demonstration 
park in Abuja, Nigeria; and Guangxi Agricultural 
Cultivation Group Ltd., a large state-owned company in 
China. 
Conclusion
The Ethio-China ATDC brought a working approach 
from China into Ethiopia. Even though they are working 
in a different environment, the staff follow basic 
assumptions, principles and experiences from their work 
in China. 
From the design to the implementation, the ATDC in 
Ethiopia is very similar to agricultural research and 
development projects in China, particularly in the late-
reform term of new China. The design was a combination 
of different modern technologies applied in rural China, 
and progress was made by adjusting and mobilising 
resources for project set-up, by adjusting to new demands 
and changing conditions, and through a mixture of 
individual actions and management routine. 
Without any training on foreign aid project 
management or working style, the ATDC experts followed 
their working style from China. The concepts of 
agricultural cooperation and ‘aid’ feel very far away. They 
say they are demonstrating technologies, but in reality 
they are demonstrating their way of working, and their 
gradual realisation of a different working environment.
The problem is that Ethiopia is a different environment, 
lacking the strong extension system that China has. 
Therefore, even though the ATDC is following the 
effective extension approach in China, it has faced some 
problems in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, where the larger 
Chinese system is not in place, great effort and resources 
have to go into any activities outside of the ATDC, and 
so far it is not very effective in terms of outreach. Even 
when they adjust the plan, their reactions are still 
consistent with what they would do in China when 
encountering a problem extending new technologies. 
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And the direct result is that the extension largely stops 
at the ATDC.
A positive reaction to this different ‘domain’ in Ethiopia 
was necessary for this demonstration approach to go 
on, which involves personal efforts at understanding the 
local situation, making linkages with different local 
stakeholders, communicating often with contact persons 
and testing new ways of experimenting that were not 
in the original design.
With this kind of logic of ‘copying original institutions 
and beyond’, the cooperation is not only improvising but 
also following some rules brought from China and 
adjusting to partner country’s conditions. This logic is 
showing in the ATDCs in other African countries as well, 
for example, marketing of agricultural machines 
facilitated by Zimbabwe ATDC, and mushroom 
technologies application in large scope extended by 
Zambia ATDC.  In the case of agricultural investment of 
Anhui State Farm Agribusiness Group in Zimbabwe, it is 
also following that logic, and their negotiation, tough 
life, clearing the thicket and alliance going out are like 
‘reconstruction of another Anhui State Farm’ (Wu 2015). 
The ATDC project was not framed in the cosmopolitan 
concept of international development and experts there 
do not claim to be in a professional team, which is always 
unavoidable in traditional aid projects (Mosse 2011: 21). 
They are not bound into report writing or brochure 
dissemination, not to mention exchanges with other 
donors. Though there was guidance on foreign aid from 
the ECC, it was only on how to keep up a good image of 
China in front of the Ethiopian people, which could be 
diversified according to individual experts’ understanding 
of the criteria. Most of the criteria are from their 
experiences working for agricultural extension in China, 
where they were to complete particular extension and 
production tasks.
At the same time, ATDC staff in Ethiopia do not feel 
so comfortable in their roles producing and selling 
products of the ATDC. Internally, they are not from a 
company, though they are Bagui staff in name, so their 
self-identification is still as extension staff, researchers 
or officials. Furthermore, they are not optimistic on the 
commercialised operation of the ATDC: agriculture is not 
a profitable industry and it could not be sustained 
without government support, as explained by most staff 
according to their experiences in China.
While they are copying the extension system that they 
are familiar with, they do not know much about the 
cosmopolitan concept of development. In another way, 
the private-public-partnership approach does not match 
their extension work background either. So objectives, 
expected outputs and corresponding activities in the 
log-frame of a project were not integrated into the whole 
management process and implementation. At the same 
time, they could not manage to implement the ATDC 
with commercial purposes. The guidelines for actual 
activities came from how to manage and practice an 
extension project in China, though these gradually 
changed into how to manage and practice a Chinese 
extension project in Ethiopia. This means that the ATDC 
staff were not necessarily more professional than others 
working in development assistance and were not 
necessarily effective at the beginning. Those proposals 
and work plan could be explained in relevant reports 
and brochures. Donor-related development can respect 
more this type of development approach, which has its 
own timing, assessment logic and relevant indicators. 
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